This paper develops a model of two person family. Each family member attempts to maximize his or her own utility. Yet they are interdependent in two respects. Family members are interdependent, first of all, because they care about each other. Second, there are local public goods or household expenditures within the family, such as housing. The presence of household expenditures means that one family member's consumption choices affect the other family member's level of well-being. The two family members' interdependent utility maximization problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot-Nash, game theoretic framework then the model is extended to take the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a threat point in a bargaining game.
Introduction
This paper models the decisions of two people living together. Each attempts to maximize his or her own utility. Yet they are interdependent in two respects. Family members are interdependent, first of all, because they care about each other. Second, there are local public goods within the family, such as housing. The presence of public goods means that one family member's consumption choices affect the other family member's level of well-being. The two family members' interdependent utility maximization problems are solved in two stages. In the first stage we find the non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the second stage, we take the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a threat point in a bargaining game.
There are a number of approaches to modelling family decision making taken in the literature, which are surveyed in Bergstrom (1996 Bergstrom ( , 1997 and Lundberg and Pollak (1997) . Our paper ties together two strands of this literature: the non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining approaches. In non-cooperative models of the family, each family member maximizes his or her well-being (which may depend upon the consumption or utility of others) taking the behaviour of others as given. Influential early models which have this feature are Leuthold (1968) and Becker (1974) , even though neither author uses the term "non-cooperative". Non-cooperative models have also been developed by Ulph (1988) and Konrad and Lommerud (1995) , applied to the division of housework (Bragstad 1991), domestic violence (Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991) , and expenditures on children by divorced parents (Del Boca and Flinn, 1994) . The great attraction of the non-cooperative framework is that, because each person's behaviour maximizes his or her well-being, the equilibrium is self-enforcing. In contrast, cooperative bargains generally require a mechanism for contract enforcement, as there is no internal incentive to move to the bargaining solution. But, because of legal obstacles and transaction costs, families rarely write explicit contracts governing their behaviour.
It can be argued that, because families involve long-term, repeated interaction, cooperation will evolve over time, and therefore family decision making can be best understood as the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process. All cooperative models share the feature that, if cooperation does evolve, the particular cooperative allocation reached will depend crucially on what happens in the event of disagreement, variously known as the "threat point," "disagreement point," or "status quo". The seminal contributions in the cooperative bargaining literature are McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980) , which use divorce as the threat point. More recently, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) , Haddad and Kanbur (1994) and Konrad and Lommerud (1996) have developed models where the threat point is some form of non-cooperative behaviour. We agree with these authors that non-cooperation within marriage is the best choice of threat point; our points of departure are, first, we expand the non-cooperative threat point to include household public goods and caring partners.
Secondly, we consider bargaining over income transfers within the household. Finally, we use a generalized Nash bargaining framework, in which we are able to characterize fully the effects of changes in bargaining power on intra-household distribution.
The first contribution of our paper is to provide a rigorous analysis of the relationship between spending patterns and a host of other variables such as relative income of the two spouses, relative bargaining power, and caring between spouses. A number of these results, for example the characterization of observed household demands, are new or different from those of the other models in the literature. While some results are the same as the existing ones, for example the replication of Becker's (1974) "rotten kid theorem", they are also contributions in that we confirm the robustness of these results in a much more compelling model of family.
The rigorous formulation developed in this paper allows us to predict the effect of male and female incomes, particularly government transfer income, on expenditure patterns, and on the properties of the household's demand function. Tax or transfer policy designed to assist families generally involves payments to specific members of the family. Child benefits in several countries are received by mothers (for example, in Canada or the U.K.), while support in the form of tax exemptions for dependants may reduce the father's, the mother's, or both spouses' tax liabilities, depending on the income tax act in question. The unitary model of the household gives no reason to believe that it makes any difference whether benefits are received by men or women, mothers or fathers. The cooperative bargaining 1 approach developed by McElroy and Horney (1981) predicts only changes which alter the divorce positions of each partner affect expenditure patterns. However in policy debates it is generally agreed that it does matter who receives benefits when a couple is married, and not just in the event of divorce, even if there is no agreement who the appropriate recipient is (Parker and Sutherland, 1991) . This paper gives a firm theoretical basis for the claim that the targeting of benefits within families matters.
There are some things that our paper does not do. It does not follow Chiappori's (1988 Chiappori's ( , 1992 "collective" approach to modeling the family. We believe that the collective approach has fruitful applications to empirical work on intra-household distribution, but is less useful in explaining why any one of the many possible Pareto optimal allocations of resources in the households will be chosen. Our paper can be thought of as complementary to the collective approach, in that it can explain why particular variables influence intra-household allocations. Second, we do not consider dynamic aspects of household decision making, such as investment in children (Ott, 1995) or education (Konrad and Lommerud, 1996) . While a valuable project, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
The first part of the paper sets out and solves the basic Cournot-Nash model and describes the three types of equilibria. The remaining parts of the paper extend the model to use the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a threat point in a cooperative game,
A Model of Family Decision Making
In the model there are two family members, one male (m) and one female (f). The household resource 2 allocation decision is made in two stages. In the first stage, transfers between spouses are determined, either through bargaining, or through a voluntary decision. In the second stage, each family member makes his or her consumption choices, conditional on the transfer received. We solve the family's decision making problem through backwards induction. First we describe consumption choices conditional on transfer received, and then consider the outcome of intra-household bargaining over transfers.
In the resource allocation decision, each family member allocates the income at his or her disposal, denoted by Y , between spending on private, or personal, goods, p x , and household public
goods, x , subject to the budget constraint:
We assume that the partners face the same price for the private good purely for notational convenience.
All of our results would be qualitatively similar if the partners faced different prices, however they would be more cumbersome to state. The price of the household good is normalized to one. There is no home produced good. The model is most valuable in addressing the policy of targeting income transfers within the family, hence we focus on transferring, and spending money incomes. One spouse may also transfer part of his income to the other. Let I denote the earned income of spouse i. Without i any loss of generality, we assume that the male spouse has a higher income level than the female spouse (I > I ) and let p be the net transfer from the former to the latter. Then the disposable income of the The functions u(·) and v(·) satisfy the standard assumptions that uN > 0, vN > 0, uO < 0, vO < 0, and uN(0) =4, vN(0) = 4. These assumptions imply that x and x are normal goods.
The form of the utility function (2) preferences of this form "caring preferences", a term which has been adopted by Chiappori (1992) and others. Caring preferences involve cardinalization and interpersonal comparability. Yet this assumption is appropriate, given our focus on income transfers. We do in fact observe transfers of income within households (Woolley and Marshall, 1994) , and it seems reasonable to assume that people, when making such transfers, are able to compare the utility they receive from consumption with that their spouse receives. The focus on income transfers also justifies the assumption of non-paternalism. When the higher income partner is non-paternalistic, he will be indifferent between making income and in-kind transfers to the lower income partner. Although some authors (for example Becker, 1996: 237) In what follows we will first analyse a situation where no transfer is allowed between the family members, i.e., p is assumed to be 0. We will derive the Nash equilibrium in a game where the two family members choose their expenditure on private and household goods (x and x ) noni i h cooperatively and will call it the "pre-transfer equilibrium". We then allow transfer between family members. We first consider voluntary transfers, then go on to examine the Nash bargaining solution with regard to the amount of transfer, using the pre-transfer equilibrium as the threat point. We examine how the amount transferred and consequently each spouse's consumption is affected by bargaining power, caring between spouses, and each spouse's income level.
Pre-transfer Resource Allocation
In this section we characterize the allocation of resources within the household prior to any income transfers, that is, constraining transfers between the partners to zero (p =0). Because one spouse's expenditure on household goods enters into the other's welfare function (see equations (2) and (3)), each partner's spending on the household good will depend on how much she expects the other to spend. We resolve the interdependence between the partners' decisions using the Cournot-Nash solution concept. Each spouse maximizes his or her own well-being, taking the other's behaviour as given.
The optimization problem of spouse i is then to maximize objective function (3) subject to the budget constraint (1) (with p being set to 0) and taking partner j's household goods purchases, x , as j h given. We can solve (1) for x and substitute the resulting expression into (3). The optimization i problem of spouse i can then be written as:
A non-negativity constraint is imposed on x in (4) 
in other words, a fall in spouse f's income leads to a downward shift in her reaction function. Hence, we would expect that the equilibrium moves from an interior equilibrium (A) towards a corner solution (B) as spouse f's income decreases. We can, in fact, prove that this will always be the case, as stated in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Given I , there exists I in the interval (0, I ) such that the pre-transfer Nash
The income level I is that at which spouse f is just indifferent between contributing and not contributing a to the household public good. We will refer to I as the "contribution threshold" income level. ii is similar to that behind Proposition 2.i. However Proposition 2.ii.a differs from 2.i.a in that it describes the free-riding which occurs in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium; as one spouse's spending on household public goods increases, the other decreases.
Voluntary Income Transfers
In this section we remain within the non-cooperative, Cournot-Nash, framework, but allow one Proposition 3. A small transfer from m to f has no effect on x , x , and x if I > I .
Proposition 3 is an application to the household of Warr's (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian's (1987) finding that income redistribution is irrelevant in the presence of privately provided public goods.
Our finding differs from that of Konrad and Lommerud (1995: 594) , who establish non-neutrality in the case where spouses differ in their productivity in public good production. In our model, if we allowed the spouses to face different prices for household goods, we would also find non-neutrality. However we differ from Konrad and Lommerud (1995) in that, in our model, non-neutrality does not establish a case for government redistribution. Rather, at an interior solution, the spouse which faced the higher price for household goods would voluntarily transfer income to the spouse facing the lower household goods price.
Since transfers are irrelevant when I >I , we will focus our analysis of transfer on the case I # We term I the "transfer threshold" income level, as it is the level of spouse f's income at which spouse b m is just indifferent between making and not making an transfer to her. The parameter s determines the In the voluntary transfer equilibrium, spouse m chooses an amount of transfer that maximizes his own welfare, i.e., he sets MW (p)/Mp = 0. Using equations (1), (3), and (5) we can write this firstm order condition as:
Equation (7) As a corollary, we can observe that the level of household goods provided will be efficient. Since household expenditures maximize the welfare of the higher income spouse, and all goods are normal, we find:
Suppose spouse f's income is such that I < I . As the income of spouse f, I , f f b rises, both total expenditure on the household good and expenditure on private goods of the two persons rise.
The voluntary transfer equilibrium is interesting because it describes precisely the circumstances under which the household's behaviour can be represented by the preferences of a single individual.
However, it is vulnerable to the criticisms levied at Becker's (1974) qualitatively similar approach. The voluntary transfer equilibrium will be an appropriate characterization of intra-household relationships if the higher income spouse has all the bargaining power, and is able to impose the transfer that maximizes his or her welfare. It will also hold if the higher income spouse is a player in an asymmetric bargaining game in which he can offer the others all-or-nothing choices (Pollak, 1985: 599) . In many instances, however, the lower income spouse does have alternative. She does not have to accept the transfer offered by her spouse. She can refuse, and bargain over the size of the transfer offered. In the next
section of the paper, we describe a generalized bargaining framework, which allows for a range of bargaining outcomes, including the voluntary transfer outcome as a special case.
Nash bargained income transfers
In this section we model the case where the amount of transfer is determined within the household through some implicit or explicit bargaining process. We begin by setting up a generalized Nash bargaining framework. We then describe conditions under which positive Nash bargained transfers take place, and the effect of the transfer on each spouse's contribution to the household public good.
We find that, when income transfers are determined through intra-household bargaining, the resulting resource allocation is, in general, not Pareto efficient, and the Rotten Kid theorem results, recovered in section 3, no longer hold.
We model the household's decision on the amount of transfer as the solution to the following generalized Nash bargaining problem:
In the above problem, (W (0), W (0)) represents the disagreement point; no transfer would be made if will term a "pro-male" outcome. Second, both spouses may contribute to the household good, which we will term a "egalitarian" outcome. Finally, it is possible for spouse f to become the sole contributor to the household good, which we call a "pro-female" outcome. We use the terms "pro-male" and "pro-female" advisedly. When spouse m (f) is the sole contributor to the household good, his (her) welfare is strictly greater than with the other two types of outcomes. This can be seen intuitively by observing that, if spouse m is not contributing to the household good, it is because he is constrained with respect to spending on his private good. He only contributes to the household good when he has achieved his preferred level of private goods expenditure.
To characterize the circumstances under which each of these outcomes arise, we define two critical values of p: pN and pO. Let pN be the largest transfer with which spouse f does not contribute to the household good (x = 0). Any higher p will create an egalitarian outcome, with both spouses f h contributing to the household good. Using the first order conditions to the individual welfare
maximization problems (5), we can see that spouse f will begin to contribute to the household public good when the transfer, pN, equalizes the marginal utility she receives from expenditures on private goods and expenditures on the household good.
We define pO (> pN) as the transfer level at which spouse m ceases contributing to the household good.
Using first order conditions for individual welfare maximization (5) once more, pO is defined by For p < pN, spouse m is the sole purchaser of the household good for the family. As p is increased to the interval (pN, pO), both spouses contribute to the household good. Within this interval, any change in p has no real effect. An increased transfer to f will be used to increase f's purchase of the household good so as to keep the combined household expenditure constant, as in Proposition 3. As p is further raised to above pO, spouse f becomes the sole purchaser of the public good for the family.
Although we can define a transfer large enough to reverse the profile of household goods contributions, could such a transfer ever be the outcome of intra-household bargaining? We now characterize the solution to the Nash bargaining game, and describe how the outcome changes with the key parameters in our model. From an inspection the bargaining problem (9), it is obvious that
Mp .
(12)
bargaining power, a, influences the size of the transfer. On the other hand, the amount that m is willing to give to f also depends on how much he cares about her utility level (i.e., the value of s), and each spouse's level of income.
We will start with a brief comment on the special, "dictatorial", case a = 0, and then turn to the general case a 0 [0, 1]. The case a = 0 is worth special attention for several reasons. First, it is relatively easy to analyse. Second, it has important empirical relevance to societies where the property and legal rights of women are restricted, as has been the case historically in Western and other societies, for example, with the doctrine of coverture. Third, when a = 0, the generalized Nash bargaining problem in (9) is equivalent to the "voluntary transfer" equilibrium, where spouse m chooses a transfer to maximize his welfare. The voluntary transfer equilibrium is a useful benchmark case.
Comparing the conditions under which a voluntary transfer takes place (7) with the conditions under which spouse f will begin to contribute to the household good (10), we conclude that the dictatorial transfer will be less than pN. Spouse m will continue to be the sole contributor to the household good. This is true regardless of the degree of sympathy, s, between the spouses. However, as s approaches one, the three outcomes converge. When s=1, the household maximizes W +W , and f m the quantity of household goods, male private goods and female private goods purchased is independent of the incomes of the spouses.
Next, we consider the general case where a may take on any value in the [0,1] interval. The first-order condition to the Nash bargaining problem (9) is:
The general case is more complicated to analyse because, as spouse f gains more bargaining power, in equilibrium she may be able to extract a transfer equal to pN, and create an egalitarian outcome, or even a transfer greater than pO, creating a pro-female outcome. Whether f is able to extract such a large transfer depends on, in addition to her bargaining power, the amount of caring between spouses.
If the caring between spouses is below a some critical threshold, which we denote sN, m's welfare may drop to the level of the disagreement point before the amount of transfer reaches pN. In this case, the equilibrium outcome will always be pro-male. Formally: The significance of Proposition 8 is twofold. First, it implies that there is some critical level of caring above which an egalitarian outcome, or possibly a pro-female outcome, can be reached through intrahousehold bargaining. Second, it shows that caring worsens spouse m's bargaining position, all else being equal, by making the no-transfer disagreement point less attractive.
When caring is below the critical threshold, s < sN, the amount of transfer will never exceed pN, and the outcome will remain "pro-male". Although this case is similar to the "dictatorial" case with a = 0 in that both are favorable to spouse m, we cannot generalize the effects of exogenous change in f's income I on consumption from the dictatorial to the general case. An increase in spouse f's income decreases the transfer she receives and, because funds are diverted from the transfer into other forms of spending, m's household and private goods expenditures rise.
Indeed, the transfer f receives may fall by more than the amount her income increases, which is why the impact of income increases on f's private expenditures is ambiguous. Transfers would be reduced more than dollar for dollar if the increase in spending on household goods resulted in an increase in her utility sufficient to compensate for lower private expenditures.
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The following proposition considers the same "pro-male" outcome, and demonstrates that, when m has only limited caring for f, her ability to improve her position through gains in bargaining power is restricted. Over the range in which bargaining power matters, however, an improvement in f's bargaining position will have real effects on household demands.
Proposition 11
On the other hand, if a < a a Nash-bargained transfer will increase m's well- Proposition 11 is significant in that it shows the "rotten kid theorem" result restated in Proposition 6, namely that household consumption patterns reflect the preferences of the higher income spouse, with the corollary that an efficient level of household goods is provided, do not hold for a>0. Instead, an increase in spouse f's bargaining power, moves the household towards a more egalitarian outcome, at the expense of efficiency in household public goods production.
Next we turn to the case where s > sN. Because W (pN) > W (0), it is possible, then, for m m spouse f to receive a transfer larger than pO and become the sole purchaser of the household good.
This will happen if f's bargaining power is large enough.
Proposition 12
Consider the case I < I and s > sN. There exists a critical a 0 (0, 1) such that When s > sN and a < a , the equilibrium is pro-male. The comparative static results in Proposition 9 b apply to this case as well. When a=a the transfer will be between pNand pO. The exact size of the b transfer is indeterminate, as all transfers in this range result in the same, egalitarian, solution. The egalitarian outcome is a "knife-edge" solution, which will only prevail under very special circumstances.
The next proposition deals with the pro-female outcome, which occurs when a > a . 
Comparison with the Unitary Model of family
In this section we contrast the results from our model to those arising when the household is assumed to maximize a single welfare function subject to a single budget constraint -the "unitary" model of the household. In the unitary model, the household maximizes a household welfare function W=W(x ,x ,x ) m f h subject to a single budget constraint demand functions is that they depend on total household full income, not the division of (full) income between spouses.
In our model, however, division of income between spouses does matter for a wide range of parameter values. It matters, first, in that the changes in the intra-household distribution of income alters the demand for the household good, and for each spouse's private good, holding total household income constant. For example, in terms of spending on the household good, Propositions 2, 7 and 9
imply that, holding I fixed, x will vary with I as illustrated in Figure 2 . As a corollary, Recent studies have found shifts in household expenditure patterns as spouses' relative income changes consistent with the predictions of the model. Phipps and Burton (1993) , using the Canadian family expenditure survey, find that relative share of husband and wife in family income shapes commodity demands for seven out of 12 commodities studied. Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), again using Canadian family expenditure survey data, find that as the wife's share of income increases, so too does her share of expenditures, just as Figure 3 predicts. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) find that the replacement of the U.K. child tax allowance received by the father with child benefits paid to the mother resulted in a significant increase in expenditure on children's clothing.
An alternative method of testing the model is to examine the flow of financial resources within household. The model makes a number of predictions about household financial management patterns.
First, when one partner has a sufficiently low income, so the family is at a positive transfers solution, the model predicts that she will receive an income transfer from the other spouse, but will not have full access to all household resources. Second, at a no-transfers corner solution, we would expect the lower income spouse's own earnings to be reserved for her use -we would not expect the higher income spouse to have access to these moneys. Third, when the partners are at an interior solution, they may adopt any one of a variety of household financial management systems. Since expenditures on household goods effectively pool their resources, we would expect to see a number of these households contributing their income to a common pool, adopting a "pooling" or "shared management" budgeting system. However the partners may also choose to manage their incomes independently, each making their own chosen contribution to household public goods out of their own earnings.
Until recently most studies of family financial management have been small, sociological case studies. The findings of these studies have, however, been broadly consistent with the hypotheses of the model. For example, Pahl (1989) has found that the independent management system is most common in dual-earner couples, who would be expected to be indifferent between shared and other forms of management. Allowance or whole wage systems, which involve a transfer from one spouse to the other, appear in single-earner couples, where one partner is more likely to have a low enough income that transfers of income occur voluntarily, as the theory predicts. However, as more data on household financial management becomes available, economists have now begun to use this to examine transfers, for example, Woolley and Marshall (1994) and Dobbelsteen and Kooreman (1997) . Our model provides a rigorous theoretical foundation for such empirical work.
Conclusions
The model developed in this paper is, in one sense, a straightforward extension of the theory of rational choice. All that we have done is recognize that within households there are often two or more rational decision makers. Yet this small change has radical implications. It can be seen that the distribution of income between household members matters, and will generally affect commodity demands.
The model developed in this paper provides a theoretical explanation for recent empirical work, which has found expenditures on certain items, such as food, clothing, or children's clothes, tend to increase as female incomes rise. It also develops a framework within which it is possible to analyse the targeting of benefits to men and women, to mothers or to fathers.
1.As one referee points out, male and female incomes matter in the unitary model to the extent that an increase in female incomes resulting from increased hours of work may be associated with a substitution of market goods for home produced goods. Our focus is not on this type of income change but rather on income changes resulting from changes in government targeting of benefits or from changes in employment income of full-time, full year workers which might arise from, say, a move from individual to joint taxation (or vice versa).
2.Although the model applies equally well to partners in same-sex relationships.
3. The proofs of all propositions are in Appendix.
4.Sen 1990 and Agarwal 1994 contain excellent discussions of the determinants of intra-household bargaining power 5.We do not model labour supply in this paper, however the disincentive effects created by such transfer changes are certainly merit further exploration 
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